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Resum 
El concepte de Food Defense inclou totes les activitats emprades per prevenir la contaminació 
intencional dels productes alimentaris per agents biològics, químics, físics o radiològics. 
El projecte es basa en la realització d'un pla de Food Defense per prevenir el terrorisme alimentari 
en un càtering d'aerolínies. Això es durà a terme a partir de les mesures de seguretat ja existents 
de l'empresa, amb l'objectiu de complementar-les i millorar-les amb les eines necessàries per 
assegurar la seguretat i protecció de la producció alimentària de l'empresa. Es tracta d'un tema de 
vital importància donades les brutals conseqüències que podria desencadenar la falta de 
prevenció contra el bioterrorisme. 
Per això, es farà un estudi exhaustiu de totes les instal·lacions posant especial èmfasi en les zones 
més crítiques i sensibles que presenten més vulnerabilitat i poden ser més fàcilment alterades, 
creant un pla de defensa eficient perquè el risc d'aquest tipus de successos sigui el mínim. 
A més, s'inclourà una valoració econòmica per analitzar i descriure el gran impacte que podria 
tenir un atac de bioterrorisme en una empresa alimentària. 
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Resumen 
El concepto de Food Defense incluye todas las actividades empleadas para prevenir la 
contaminación intencional de los productos alimentarios por agentes biológicos, químicos, físicos 
o radiológicos. 
El proyecto se basa en la realización de un plan de Food Defense para prevenir el terrorismo 
alimentario en un catering de aerolíneas. Esto se llevará a cabo a partir de las medidas de 
seguridad ya existentes de la empresa, con el objetivo de complementarlas y mejorarlas con las 
herramientas necesarias para asegurar la seguridad y protección de la producción alimentaria de 
la empresa. Se trata de un tema de vital importancia dadas las brutales consecuencias que podría 
desencadenar la falta de prevención contra el bioterrorismo. 
Para ello, se hará un estudio exhaustivo de todas las instalaciones poniendo especial énfasis en las 
zonas más críticas y sensibles que presentan más vulnerabilidad y pueden ser más fácilmente 
alteradas, creando un plan de defensa eficiente para que el riesgo de este tipo de sucesos sea el 
mínimo. 
Además, se incluirá una valoración económica para analizar y describir el gran impacto que podría 
tener un ataque de bioterrorismo en una empresa alimentaria. 
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Abstract 
The Food Defense concept includes all the activities used to prevent intentional contamination of 
food products by biological, chemical, physical or radiological agents. 
This project consists of the implementation of a Food Defense Plan to prevent food terrorism in 
an airline catering. The plan will be carried out based on the company's existing security 
measures, to complement and improve them with the necessary tools to assure the safety and 
protection of the company's food production. It is a vital importance aspect of food safety given 
the brutal consequences that could have the lack of prevention against bioterrorism. 
To do this, an exhaustive study of all the facilities will be done, placing special emphasis on the 
most critical and sensitive areas that are more vulnerable and can be more easily altered, creating 
an efficient defense plan to minimize the risk of food adulteration. 
In addition, an economical valuation will be done to analyze and describe the amount of impact 
that could have a bioterrorism attack in a food company. 
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1. Introduction 
The food industry considers the safety of the products as the most important aspect to take 
care of. Over the years, there have been developed several food safety management systems, 
such as the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles, which has proven to be 
effective against accidental contamination but not against food fraud. 
The main cause of deliberate acts is people. They can be from another food business, can be 
unsatisfied employees, or can be outsiders with no connection to the food business. The one thing 
they have in common is the aim to cause damage in many ways like human health or business 
reputation. They can also expect to make financial gains at the expense of the business. Either 
way, it is vital for the food business to protect itself from these kind of attacks. [1] 
To do that, the main objective of food industry is to minimize the risk. There is risk if an attacker 
has the ability, the opportunity (where to do harm) and the desire to damage the product. 
Eliminating the opportunity is the only way to manage this risk. [2] Some frequent risks are: 
- Possibility of introducing the polluting agent in the less controlled stages of a process. 
- Ability to perform the act intentionally with enough time to alter the product and without being 
discovered. 
It is important to effectively protect 100% of the production chain. There has to be priorities and 
an organized way to establish this protection. Goals are identifying, mitigating and monitoring 
possible sources of intentional contamination of food. [2] 
Food Defense is not the same as Food Safety. Food Defense focuses on protecting the food supply 
from intentional or deliberate contamination, with a variety of chemicals, biological agents or 
other harmful substances by people who want to cause damage. 
These agents include a wide variety of materials and are often difficult to detect once in the food. 
Additionally, these incidents do not regularly occur, so we cannot predict when and if they will 
even occur. [3] 
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In the other hand, Food Safety identifies physical, chemical and biological harmful agents that are 
non-intentional but can appear due to a food chain negligence. 
Many food companies now have a Food Defense plan in place to protect food from intentional 
contamination. The Food Defense plan includes policies and procedures to prevent, maintain, 
protect, respond to and recover from the intentional or deliberate contamination of the food 
production. The management is responsible for developing a company’s Food Defense plan, and 
there is a responsibility of following the appropriate procedures included in the plan. 
The objective of this document is to create a Food Defense plan for an airline catering, due to the 
vulnerability of this kind of company in case of a bioterrorist attack. Even though there is no law in 
Europe claiming that a Food Defense plan must be established in all food companies, there is a 
potential risk of an act like this happening and it is in everyone’s interest to control it in the best 
possible way. 
The motivation of the Food Defense plan does not come up from the economic benefit but from 
the need to protect human lives and avoid a bioterrorist attack. This is reflected on the multiple 
cases where food intentional contamination has taken place over the years, for example, in 1984 
the Rajneeshee bioterror attack in Oregon (USA) through the deliberate contamination of salad 
bars with Salmonella. [4] Also, in 2008 the Chinese milk scandal involved milk and infant 
formula along with other food materials and components being adulterated with melamine.  [5] 
In addition, this plan provides a differentiation from the competition, an improvement in the 
company reputation and a confidence increase by the clients, due to the strict additional security 
measures and the intensification of the ones already established in the company. 
 
First, we will mention some of the legislation and regulations that actually apply to Food Safety. 
Secondly, we will introduce the subject by explaining the principles in which Food Defense is 
based. After that, we will deepen every stage of a Food Defense plan implementation to show 
every step of the process and apply it to the airline catering. Last of all, we will evaluate an 
economic impact considering the risks and the possibility of an attack, and its consequential loss. 
10   
 
2. Legislation and regulations 
2.1. United States legislation 
There is a law of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that guarantees consumer safety 
throughout the entire food chain. The law against bioterrorism comes into force on December 12, 
2003. This law includes legal provisions with the purpose of improving the ability of prevention 
and response of the US in the case of a terrorist attack with biological, chemical and radiological 
agents. [6] 
Food bioterrorism is considered the premeditated action of deliberate adulteration or 
contamination of food and beverages for human or animal consumption; or of the raw materials 
or additives used in their elaboration through biological agents, microorganisms or pathogens 
(bacteria, fungi, viruses, parasites...), which can seriously endanger public health and even cause 
death. [6] 
The FDA also created an initiative to raise awareness in the preparation of Food Defense, as 
described in Table 1. 
Table 1. ALERT iniciative [7] 
A Assure Ensure that the ingredients come from safe and harmless sources 
L Look Monitor the safety of products and ingredients 
E Employees Know the employees and the people who enter the facilities 
R Reports Keep reports about the safety of the products 
T Threat Notify when there is a threat or any suspicious activity on the facility 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) states that: “An informed and alerted staff is 
more likely to detect weaknesses in a Food Defense system and to detect and properly respond to 
signs of intentional contamination.” [3] 
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2.2. European legislation 
There is no specific European legislation on Food Defense. The risk management is done from 
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), which is based on accidental 
contamination. 
There is no similar law in Europe as the one in the United States because there is not that 
much of awareness of this matter. Only the International Food Standard (IFS) and the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) partially cover the gap. 
Food Defense in Europe could be a competitive advantage at the export level of the European 
community products. 
 
2.2.1 Food Defense referential 
As previously mentioned, in Europe there are two certification standards: the IFS and BRC 
Global Standard for Food Safety. Another reference that applies Food Defense is the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 22000 since January 2017. 
 
These certification standards have the following requirements: 
 
 Creation of a Food Defense team 
This is based on the responsibility assignment to the right employees of the company to assure 
an effective defense planning. These members can be from human resources, maintenance, 
production, quality assurance… 
 
 Hazard and critical areas analysis 
First, possible hazards must be listed and critical areas identified. Then, different zones must 
be assigned a score based on the result of the hazard analysis. Various methods can be used in 
this analysis. 
 
 Review of the hazard analysis 
A review of the hazard analysis should be done, minimum once a year or whenever there is 
evidence that the system does not work or there is a change in the system. Also, an alert 
system has to be established to notify that. 
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 Control measures assessment 
Measures such as simulation or a checklist of control measures to see if they are applied. If it is 
not effective, it is necessary to re-evaluate hazards and start training programs. 
 
 On-site regulatory inspections and reports 
This final step is necessary to check if the Food Defense program is really working out. 
 
2.3. Spanish legislation 
In Spain, Law 8/2011 on legislation, there is a national center for the protection of critical 
infrastructures (CNPIC), where food is included. This is the only approach to Food Defense. A 
critical infrastructure provides essential services, it does not allow alternative solutions and its 
destruction or disturbance is a serious impact. [2] It has the following structure: 
Sector strategic plans  Operator safety plan  Specific protection plan  Support plans 
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3. Principles to establish and implement Food Defense 
3.1 Principle of risk assessment 
The risk assessment is the basis of the Food Defense plan. In this case, vulnerabilities are identified 
as a risk that can affect food production in the catering and decrease the efficiency of the 
prevention measures to avoid a terrorist attack in an airplane. The accuracy and precision of the 
risk assessment determines the effectiveness of the entire Food Defense plan. [8] 
3.2 Principle of prevention 
The Food Defense plan includes an evaluation of the current preventive measures counting on the 
severity of the risk and impact. In this way, the risk of intentional destruction is minimized. [8] 
3.3 Principle of confidentiality 
The process of evaluating the defense and the protective details of the scheme should be 
confidential to prevent food security risks. [8] In this case, the plan carried out for the airline 
catering will be fictional in many aspects and sensitive information of the company will not be 
revealed.  
3.4 Principle of communication 
Communication can help identify the possibility of deliberate contamination and respond on time. 
It can also help improve the relevance and precautionary measures, to improve its effectiveness 
and prevent most Food Safety incidents. [8] There has to be a proper communication between 
the catering and the airline to detect and respond to any potential attack. 
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4. Implementation of the Food Defense plan 
 
The Food Defense plan it is a written plan to record the activities implanted in a company to 
control and reduce the potential for the occurrence of an intentional contamination event. [2] 
This plan must identify vulnerabilities and actionable process steps, mitigation strategies, and 
procedures for food defense monitoring, corrective actions and verification. 
To prepare a proper Food Defense plan it is essential to analyze the vulnerabilities found on the 
company system. This is called the vulnerability assessment, which is shown on the following 
pages of this document. Once the vulnerabilities are defined, it is necessary to establish a control 
plan to prevent them or apply adequate corrective measures to minimize the damage. The best 
way of prevention against food terrorism is staff training. Making sure employees know the risks 
and the consequences of intentional contamination can help create awareness and a better 
detection of suspicious or unusual activities, increasing the efficiency of the plan. 
Finally, verification tests of the plan and documentation is needed, so it is known that the plan is 
working correctly. In addition, at least once a year a complete audit of the plan should be made. 
The plan should be modified and evaluated whenever there is a change in the system. [7] 
All the steps included in the food chain must be considered to control the risk of introducing 
the polluting agent in the most vulnerable and less controlled stages. The hazard analysis must 
be carried out based on the conditions that suppose a risk of adulteration intentional acts.  
Some aspects to consider are: the nature of the product (type, lot size, shelf life…), the location 
and accessibility to both the facility and the product, and the people working in the facility. [2] 
For the implementation of the Food Defense Plan to be successful, it is essential to assure the 
accomplishment of the FIRST rule for all personnel, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Steps of the FIRST rule [8] 
F FOLLOW Follow the plan and established procedures 
I INSPECT Inspect your work area and surroundings 
R RECOGNIZE Recognize anything out of the ordinary 
S SECURE Secure all ingredients, supplies and finished products 
T TELL Notify someone of something unusual or suspicious 
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5. Stages of the Food Defense plan 
5.1. Assignment of responsibilities: Creation of the Food Defense 
team 
The members of the Food Defense team should not only have a sense of responsibility and 
integrity, but also necessary knowledge, experience and be qualified. The overall responsibility for 
the plan will be assigned to a single employee with decision-making capacity who understands the 
safety requirements. Employees will have their responsibilities defined and documented. [9] 
The team should be integrated by the responsible of different areas of the company creating a 
multidisciplinary team, as well as external support from experts when necessary. 
All procedures and operating rules that the team establishes in the company are confidential, as 
well as the obtained results, to avoid possible attacks. 
5.2. Food Defense evaluation: Vulnerability analysis and Critical 
Control Points (CCP) 
The evaluation of the defense is the basis of the entire Food Defense plan, and is carried out 
mainly with the Food Defense team. The purpose is identifying the risks of deliberate acts and 
possible damage to the products, which is the main concern. 
This part of the plan is based on the identification of the vulnerabilities and the action steps for 
each type of food manufactured, processed, packed or held at the food facility. It is about 
evaluating how vulnerable a facility is for the presentation of a certain danger and the possibility 
of harm from that danger. [2] 
Vulnerability depends on the flow diagram of the products manufactured and the processing 
conditions: products that require intense mixing, large production lots, easily accessible products, 
long-term products...etc. [2] 
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A vulnerability analysis must be carried out with the degree of threat and associated level of risk. 
For each point, step, or procedure in the facility’s process, different elements must be evaluated: 
[10] 
 The severity and scale of the potential impact on public health. This would include such 
considerations as the volume of product, the number of servings, the number of exposures, 
the quickness of the distribution, the potential contaminated agents and their infection 
degree; and the possible number of illnesses and deaths. 
 The degree of physical access to the product. Things to be considered would include the 
presence of physical barriers like doors, lids and seals. 
 The ability to successfully contaminate the product. 
 
The analysis can be concretized in some important aspects, such as: employees (trained in 
Food Defense procedures and policies), visitors (limiting the access to restricted areas), raw 
material warehouse, finished product warehouse, chemical agents warehouse, water security, 
security in the processing area, loading and shipping of finished products…etc. 
5.2.1. Risk assessment tools 
5.2.1.1. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
 
HACCP is the standard procedure based on accidental contamination. However, HACCP 
principles are not that reliable when it comes to deliberate attacks on a system or process. 
Such attacks include deliberate contamination, electronic intrusion, and fraud. Deliberate acts 
may have food safety implications but can harm organizations in other ways, such as damaging 
business reputation or extorting money. [1] 
Many companies nowadays use the HACCP method, indicated in Figure 1, instead of a real Food 
Defense method because maybe economically they can not afford all the security measures or 
because the law in Europe does not force any food industry to establish a Food Defense plan. 
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Figure 1. HACCP diagram process 
5.2.1.2. Threat Assessment of Critical Control Points (TACCP) 
Unlike the previous method, the TACCP aims to reduce the chance and the consequences of a 
terrorist attack by taking in consideration several factors: the motivation of the attacker, the 
probability of the attack to happen, the opportunity and capability of carrying out the attack, the 
vulnerability of the process and the severity of the attack (the impact on the human health). [1] 
Then, assessing the potential impact by considering the consequences of a successful attack and 
judging the priority to be given to different threats by comparing their likelihood and impact, it 
establishes a priority of threats based on the risks. 
In addition, it decides upon proportionate controls needed to discourage the attacker and give 
early notification of an attack. [1] 
 
Hazard analysis
Identification of CCP
Establishment of 
critical limits
Development of 
monitoring
procedures
Corrective actions
Verification
Documentation
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In this way, this method demonstrates that reasonable precautions are taken and due diligence is 
exercised in protecting food. So it also helps the company reputation. 
As we can see in Figure 2, there are several steps to complete a TACCP process, and like every 
other method, every step of the process should be revised to  make sure a proper prevention. 
 
Figure 2. TACCP process flowchart [1] 
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5.2.1.3. CARVER + Shock 
This method has similar conditions to the TACCP, but instead of identifying the threat of food 
adulteration, it identifies how vulnerable various points in the supply chain are to the threat. 
Therefore, it is an offensive prioritization methodology to assess the vulnerabilities of food supply 
chains. These seven concepts shown in Table 3 are scored for each zone and part of the process. 
Next, an action plan is established by the Food Defense team based on the punctuation of each 
risk. The more score has the parameter, the more significance it gets. 
Table 3. CARVER analysis method [11] 
C Criticality Impact that an attack would have on the public health or the economy of the company 
A Accessibility Ease of access to the critical point by a terrorist and to attack without being detected 
R Recoverability Difficulty to recover productivity after the attack to that critical point 
V Vulnerability 
Ease with which a polluting agent can be introduced in sufficient quantities to achieve a 
significant act of sabotage, once the facility has been accessed 
E Effect Direct loss resulting from an attack per loss of production 
R Recognition Ease of a terrorist to identify the target 
Shock Limitation of the impact that may affect public health, depending on the number of deaths 
5.3. Food Defense prevention: Security measures 
After obtaining the most vulnerable regions to intentional tampering and other vulnerabilities in 
daily operational procedures, we must formulate effective and preventive control measures to 
minimize the possibility of deliberate harm. Food Defense measures should be set after analyzing 
all the steps, including the existing defense measures of the facility. 
The mitigation strategies should be identified and implemented at every critical process step to 
provide assurances that vulnerabilities will be minimized or prevented. These strategies must be 
tailored to the facility and its procedures.  
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They include monitoring (establishing and implementing procedures, including the frequency with 
which they are to be performed), corrective actions (in case they are not properly implemented), 
and verification activities to ensure that monitoring is being conducted and appropriate decisions 
about corrective actions are being made. [10] 
5.3.1. People controls 
Controlling the people that have access to the facility is one of the most important methods of 
control. In a food processing facility, there are basically employees (those working at the facility 
on a regular basis) and visitors (including vendors, contractors, tour groups, and inspectors). 
A basic control could be wearing an ID badge. For employees it may include a picture and a bar 
code or magnetic strip that allows them to access the building. For visitors, ID badges should 
clearly identify the person was approved to enter the facility, there should be a system for 
checking visitors in and out, and they must never be left alone. 
As previously mentioned, staff training is the best way of prevention towards food intentional 
contamination. So employees should be trained to notice unusual behavior and report every 
warning sign when necessary. [3] 
5.3.2. Physical controls 
Access points where aggressors can enter a critical area of the facility need to have adequate 
control measures. For this reason, access should be limited through a common door and all other 
doors should be locked to the outside. The main door can be locked or guarded to restrict the 
access of unauthorized people. 
Securing and monitoring the exterior perimeter of the facility is very important because there may 
be water tanks or air handling units that can be a target for aggressors. [3] 
5.3.3. Receiving and shipping controls 
This kind of controls are especially important because control of food and other items during the 
transportation process may be compromised. Trucks and other distribution vehicles should be 
inspected before reception and delivery to detect possible signs of tampering. 
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A great way to control that is the use of tamper evident seals on in-coming and out-going 
shipments, to verify and notify if there has been manipulation. This will prevent unauthorized 
deliveries or vehicles to enter the facility. [3] 
5.3.4. Product controls 
Controlling products is another important step of the Food Defense plan. These controls may 
include procedures such as receiving a certificate of analysis indicating the safety of an ingredient, 
restricting access to ingredients and finished products, and ensuring that the finished product is 
properly sealed and coded. 
Suspected product tampering may be noticed in receiving, processing or packaging. There are 
several signs easy to identify, such as compromised packaging, unusual product smell, appearance 
or taste, tamper-evident tags removed from tanks, tampering with locks…etc. [3] 
5.3.5. Suspicious behaviors 
When it comes to suspicious behaviors, it is important to remember the motives and tools an 
aggressor has to attack food. Missing items that could be used to the contamination of a product 
should be immediately reported or located. 
It is essential to know who should be in the facility and forbid personal items into production 
areas. Employees should have as another job requirement being aware of suspicious behaviors 
that may point to someone being a potential aggressor. [3] 
5.3.6. Security measures 
Total and permanent security does not exist. In order to assure a proper prevention it is necessary 
to install security systems combining several technologies and implement the corresponding rules 
and procedures. Each company must establish a limit of the investment in security. 
There are three security rings that should be considered: the external perimeter, the external area 
between the perimeter and the building, and the direct access to the facility. [2] 
The more the outer rings are protected the less need of protection there will be in the interiors. 
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External security 
 Perimeter 
 Outdoor illumination 
 Access control of people and vehicles 
 Windows 
 Locks 
 Doors and gates 
Internal security 
 Surveillance system 
 Alarms 
 Areas of restricted access 
 Computer control system 
 Cybersecurity (passwords, firewalls…) 
Productive process security 
 Verification of non-handling of ingredient packages 
 Traceability 
 Finished product registration 
 Procedures for suspicious activities 
Storage security 
 Restricted access to sensitive areas 
 Inventories 
 Procedures to send and receive products 
 Schedules of deliveries and shipments 
 Elimination of dangerous substances 
Staff security 
 Staff background check 
 Safety procedures training 
 Access control of employees and contractors 
 Visible method to identify the staff in each shift 
 Restriction of personal items in production areas 
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6. Food Defense plan of an airline catering 
In this chapter, we are going to apply everything previously mentioned with a practical example 
by focusing on the most important stages of the Food Defense plan. The company we are talking 
about is a leading provider of airline catering and provisioning services. 
In order to do that, we will use the FDA's Food Defense Plan Builder software. This program helps 
creating the Food Defense plan by providing a standard pattern easy to adapt on any kind of 
company. This tool provides examples of questions that the company should ask itself to prove if 
there is an adequate security in the facility. Then, you provide the missing information about the 
actual state of the company prevention measures and create an action plan. 
To begin with, we will determine the mitigation strategies of every section of the facility by 
analyzing the measures already taken, indicating several critical points that need to be controlled 
and deciding which ones need action steps. This is shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Mitigation strategies  
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Afterwards, we will establish the vulnerability assessment in the most critical areas of the facility 
by evaluating the risk, the current control measure, the threat degree and its possible prevention 
or correction. This analysis will be made from a template provided by the company, which follows 
the structure of the Food Defense Plan Builder sections. 
In this case, we will use the CARVER + Shock method previously mentioned, because it is 
recommended to focus on the vulnerabilities and protect the facility towards any kind of threat. 
As we can see in Table 5, the warehouse and the production area are the most sensitive areas 
according to the significance of the threat since these areas are the ones where food is 
manipulated or stored and there is a higher possibility of tampering. 
To calculate the % of significance of the threat degree, we use the following formula: 
𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝑉
30
𝑥 100 
Where: 
A: Accessibility of the attacker 
C: Criticality of the threat 
V: Vulnerability of the objective 
These three parameters are divided by 30 because is the maximum punctuation it can get. The 
score to these factors is given on own criterion according to the definitions of every parameter 
shown in Annex A. Risk assessment key 
As a result of the vulnerability assessment, we obtain a percentage of every critical area, as shown 
in Annex B. Localization and significance of the critical areas 
 
 
 
 
 
PREVENTION
Area Critical Point Threat Risk Control measure Accessibility Criticality Vulnerability Total Significance % Preventive measure Control type Frecuency Responsible Action Registry
PROPERTY PERIMETER Fencing Low height
Someone could 
jump
Fence has a spike and there is 
CCTV system
7 1 1 9 30,00 Higher fence
Surveillance 
system
3 times per 
night
Security personnel
Calling the police if there is 
intrusion detection
Surveillance 
system records
Ilumination Open area
Someone could 
access the facility 
without detection
Keeping the external area 
properly iluminated
9 5 3 17 56,67
Adequate lighting to assure good 
visibility of the building 
perimeter
Visual Every day Security personnel
Notifying maintenance 
personnel if lighting is not 
working properly
N/A
Vehicle access
Door closes slowly and it 
breaks down easily
Someone could 
access the facility 
by car or by walking
Access control at the 
reception (doorbell and 
surveillance system-CCTV)
5 7 3 15 50,00
Not opening the door to 
suspicious people and improving 
door maintenance
Surveillance 
system
Every entrance
Security personnel 
and recepcionists
Notifying security personnel in 
case of suspicious activity
Surveillance 
system records
Pedestrian access
Possibility of opening the door 
without ringing the doorbell
Someone could 
access the facility
Staff training to detect 
unauthorized people in the 
facility and keeping a 
preventive maintenance of 
the door
4 7 3 14 46,67
Regulation system to not open 
the door from the outside
Surveillance 
system
Every entrance
Security personnel 
and recepcionists
Notifying security personnel if 
someone is opening the door 
improperly
Surveillance 
system records
Parking area
Non authorized car in the 
internal perimeter
Someone could 
access the facility
Staff training to identify non 
authorized cars
2 7 3 12 40,00
Visits parking right in front of 
reception control, trucks parking 
of exlusive use, and a distintive 
sign to authorized cars
Surveillance 
system
Every entrance All personnel
Notifying security personnel if 
there is a unauthorized car
Surveillance 
system records
Emergency doors Multipurpose doors
Unauthorized 
people could access 
the production area
Staff training to detect 
unauthorized people in the 
facility
5 9 5 19 63,33
Exclusive use of emergency doors 
and card access doors
Visual Every day All personnel
Notifying security personnel if 
there is someone without 
uniform or the mob-cap in the 
production area
Staff checking in
Personnel access
Team leaders control the staff 
during Shift Briefing and 
notify Human Resources in 
case of suspicious activity
3 9 6 18 60,00
Lathe access and not showing the 
company logo on the card
Visual Every entrance Human resources
Notifying Human Resources if 
there is a non identified worker 
on shift
Staff checking in
Visits access
Reception provides proper 
clothes when a visit is 
registered. No one with a red 
mob-cap can go by itself at 
the facility. Staff training to 
notify in case of non 
authorized visits
2 9 6 17 56,67
Reception only provides the 
uniform to employees or 
authorized visits
Visual Every entrance Recepcionists
Notifying security personnel if 
there is someone without 
uniform in the production area
Visits registration
Staff control
Bad intentional worker in an 
unauthorized area
Potential tampering
Different uniform at different 
areas and mob-cap color code
3 9 6 18 60,00
Card access to different areas and 
an alarm sound when someone is 
attempting to enter where is not 
authorized
Restricted access Every entrance Human resources
Notifying the team leader if 
there is someone in a non 
authorized area
Staff checking in
Ilumination
Bad intentional worker can 
perform tampering easily 
without being seen
Intentional 
contamination 
without detection
Keeping an adequate and 
maintained lighting system
4 9 4 17 56,67
Regular testing of the lighting 
system of the facility
Reviews Every month Maintenance
Notifying the maintenance 
responsible if there is any 
trouble with the lighting 
system
Audits results
Surveillance system
Bad intentional worker can 
perform tampering easily 
without being seen
Intentional 
contamination 
without detection
A CCTV system to keep 
recordings of all areas of the 
facility
4 9 4 17 56,67
Regular reviewing of the CCTV 
recordings
Visual Every month Control Center
Notifying Human Resources if 
there is a unidentified worker 
in any CCTV recording
Surveillance 
system records
Locker rooms
Suspicious items going 
unnoticed
Personal items 
entering the critical 
areas
Inspections of the facility 
areas
5 7 5 17 56,67
Regular checking of personal 
lockers and having employees 
wear uniforms without pockets
Inspections Every month All personnel
Notifying Human Resources if a 
suspicious item is detected
Audits results
V     U     L     N     E     R     A     B     I     L     I     T     Y                    A     S     S     E     S     S     M     E     N     T
SUPERVISION
FACILITY
Lack of control of the access
Unauthorized 
people could access 
the production area
BUILDING PERIMETER
THREAT DEGREELOCALIZATION EVALUATION CORRECTIVE MEASURE
   Table 4. Vulnerability assessmentTable 5. Vulnerability Table 5. Vulnerability assessment
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
HVAC systems
Possibility of introducing a 
contamination agent to the 
product
Food and 
employees damage
Keeping HVAC systems locked 1 8 9 18 60,00
Having main air intakes in a 
fenced area
Reviews Every month Maintenance
Notifying Quality Department 
if there is any suspicious 
change on the ventilation 
system
Audits results
Refrigeration Possibility of food damaging
Intentional 
contamination
Limiting access to 
refrigeration controls
1 8 9 18 60,00
Keeping records of the cameras 
temperatures
Reviews Every month Maintenance
Notifying Quality Department 
if there are any changes of 
temperatures
Audits results
Water systems Water contamination
Intentional 
contamination
Keeping water storage 
restricted to authorized 
personnel
1 9 9 19 63,33
Regular testing of the water in 
the facility
Reviews Every month Maintenance
Cutting off the water supply if 
the water testing shows any 
sign of contamination
Audits results
Electrical  and IT 
systems
Possibility of hacking the 
computer system
Outsiders gaining 
access to 
information stored 
on the system
Installing an antivirus 
software and a firewall
1 3 3 7 23,33
Keeping access to the system to a 
limited number of authorized 
employees
Reviews Every month IT
Improving the security and 
protection of the system
Audits results
External storage
Possible access to external 
storage
Potential tampering
Keeping external storage 
restricted to authorized 
personnel
7 9 9 25 83,33 Keeping external storage locked Storage locking Every day Warehouse
Notifying security personnel if 
an unauthorized person is 
detected
Temperature 
controls
Access control
Possibility of entering the 
facility through the dock
Potential tampering
Staff training to detect 
unauthorized people in the 
facility
8 1 1 10 33,33
Keeping dock doors controlled 
and closed when not in use
Visual Every day Logistics
Notifying security personnel if 
an unauthorized person is 
detected
Surveillance 
system records
Suppliers Not trustworthy suppliers
Purchasing 
contaminated food 
from a supplier
Verification measures to 
assure a reliable source of 
purchase and ensure that 
every shipment comes from 
approved suppliers
5 9 9 23 76,67
Audits of the suppliers facilities 
and scheduled deliveries
Inspections
Every entrance 
of product
Warehouse
Stop purchasing from any 
supplier who has not adequate 
food security measures and 
notify the warehouse 
responsible in case of any 
arrival of an unknown supplier
Audits results
Incoming shipment
Incoming shipments not 
secured with tamper-evident 
seals
Material could be 
contaminated 
during shipping
All trucks and trailers with 
supplies are sealed until use
3 9 9 21 70,00
Incoming shipments with no 
tamper-evident seal are not 
accepted
Visual
Every incoming 
shipment
Logistics
Rejection of shipments without 
secured seals
Temperature 
controls
Outgoing shipment
Outgoing shipments not 
secured with tamper-evident 
seals
Finished products 
could be 
contaminated 
without detection
All trucks and trailers with 
supplies are sealed until use
3 9 9 21 70,00
Outgoing shipments with no 
tamper-evident seals are not 
delivered
Visual
Every outgoing 
shipment
Logistics
Return of shipments without 
secured seals
Temperature 
controls
Returned products
Tampering of returned 
products
Intentional 
contamination
Staff training to detect 
someone in an unauthorized 
area
7 9 9 25 83,33
Keeping products suitable for 
reuse protected and controlled
Visual
Every entrance 
of returned 
product
Logistics
Rejection of suspicious 
products
Stock inventory
LOGISTICS AND 
STORAGE
UTILITIES
Raw material 
storage
Possibility of entering the 
palletized area without 
authorization
Contamination of 
raw material
Staff training to detect 
someone in an unauthorized 
area
6 9 9 24 80,00
Keeping raw material locked or 
under supervision
Storage locking Every day Warehouse
Getting rid of any product with 
signs of manipulation
Surveillance 
system records
Chemical storage
Possibility of using chemical 
products to contaminate food
Intentional 
contamination
Keeping an inventory of 
chemical storage
5 9 9 23 76,67 Keeping chemical storage locked Storage locking Every week Warehouse
Investigate any discrepancies 
detected on the inventory
Stock inventory
Other storage areas
Contamination of ingredients, 
finished products or other 
food contact materials
Intentional 
contamination
Staff training to detect 
manipulation clues
7 9 9 25 83,33
Routine and random 
unscheduled checks of all storage 
areas
Inspections Every week Quality Assurance
Avoiding the delivery of any 
contaminated food
Surveillance 
system records
Knives and 
dangerous tools
Someone could put a small 
piece into the food or 
dangerous tools on the trolley 
that is going in the plane
Consumers of that 
food could get hurt
Keeping a knive inventory and 
dangerous tools locked
5 9 9 23 76,67
Passing food through a metal 
detector
Visual Every day Team leader
Checking the surveillance 
system to identify who did it
Surveillance 
system records
Food manipulation
Incorrect hygiene of 
manipulators
Microbiological 
contamination
Staff training to accomplish 
adequate hygiene measures
8 9 9 26 86,67
Disinfectant soaps in and out the 
production area and constant 
supervision of the team leader to 
prove hand washing of 
manipulators
Microbiological 
tests
Every day Quality Assurance
Getting fired employees that 
do not follow hygiene 
procedures
Laboratory tests 
results and 
surveillance 
system records
Food temperature
Products cooked or handled 
without proper temperature
Some 
microorganisms can 
survive
Keeping a registry of the 
temperatures and staff 
training to detect suspicious 
manipulation
8 9 9 26 86,67
Cooking food with automatic 
equipment with temperature 
control to ensure the lack of 
microorganisms
Registries and 
daily patrols
Every day Kitchen
Discarding any food improperly 
cooked and being aware of 
who are the employees of the 
kitchen
Temperature 
controls
Cooking and 
packaging
Someone could alter the food 
during making and packing of 
the flight menu
Intentional 
contamination
Staff training to detect 
suspicious activities
8 9 9 26 86,67
Cameras on the most critical 
areas
Visual Every day Quality Assurance
Checking the surveillance 
system to identify who did it
Surveillance 
system records
PRODUCTION
WAREHOUSE
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Eventually, we will implement an action plan to evaluate which corrective measures are needed 
to every process step previously analyzed in the mitigation strategies, and define its status 
(whether it is already planned to do or not possible) and its priority, depending on the urgency, as 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Action plan 
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7. Economic impact and valuation 
In this section of the document, we will evaluate the risk and the probability of a food terrorism 
attack that could happen in the airline catering, with the consequent impact and losses of 
economic value. 
The impact of a bioterrorist attack depends on several factors: the specific agent or toxin, the 
method and efficiency of dispersal, the population exposed, the level of immunity in the 
population, the availability of effective post exposure treatments and the potential for secondary 
transmission. [12] 
To calculate the impact of a bioterrorist attack, we will consider a few risk scenarios based on 
different probabilities and costs. Then we will be able to obtain different benefits of the plan 
based on every scenario. All the results will be illustrated in graphics to compare every studied 
situation. 
On the one hand, we will consider a minimum probability of happening, due to the historical data 
of this kind of events in our country. It is estimated that airplane terrorist attacks take place in 1 of 
1.000.000 flights. The number of attacks including food terrorism is even smaller. 
On the other hand, we will consider the costs of the compensation to the victims, depending on 
the quantity of affected people; and the loss of the airline companies as clients, due to the loss of 
confidence and reputation. 
The benefit of the implementation of the Food Defense plan will be the equivalent of multiplying 
the costs generated by a terrorist act because of the probability of happening before and after the 
plan: 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑥 (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
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                                                                                  SCENARIO A 
I N D E M N I F I C A T I O N   C O S T S 
Airplane capacity 293 passengers 
Affected passengers 285 passengers 
Affected flights 20 flights 
Victims indemnification 250.000 € 
285 x 20 x 250.000 = 1.425.000.000 € 
 
It is assumed that after applying the plan, the probability of the attack would be reduced in a 90%. 
The following graphics of every scenario show that the benefit of the plan would be affected 
considering different attack probabilities:  
1
1.000
 , 
1
10.000
 , 
1
100.000
 and 
1
1.000.000
 .  The benefit would 
increase if the probability is higher and viceversa. 
 
Figure 3. Plan benefits of scenario A 
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I N A C T I V I T Y   C O S T S 
Single menu price 15 €/menu 
Airplane capacity 293 passengers 
Number of flights 20 flights/month 
Lost airline companies 5 
15 x 293 x 20 x 5 = 439.500 €/month 
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SCENARIO B 
 
It is assumed that after applying the plan, the probability of the attack would be reduced in a 80%. 
 
Figure 4. Plan benefits of scenario B 
 
0,00001 0,0001 0,001 0,01 0,1
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
SCENARIO  B
Probability (%)
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
(€
)
I N A C T I V I T Y   C O S T S 
Single menu price 10 €/menu 
Airplane capacity 220 passengers 
Number of flights 24 flights/month 
Lost airline companies 4 
10 x 220 x 24 x 4 = 211.200 €/month 
I N D E M N I F I C A T I O N   C O S T S 
Airplane capacity 220 passengers 
Affected passengers 200 passengers 
Affected flights 10 flights 
Victims indemnification 250.000 € 
200 x 6 x 250.000 = 500.000.000 € 
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SCENARIO C 
 
It is assumed that after applying the plan, the probability of the attack would be reduced in a 70%. 
 
Figure 5. Plan benefits of scenario C 
As we can see in these graphics, the Food Defense Plan would be leasable if there is a high 
probability of a bioterrorist attack. 
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)
I N D E M N I F I C A T I O N   C O S T S 
Airplane capacity 132 passengers 
Affected passengers 100 passengers 
Affected flights 5 flights 
Victims indemnification 250.000 € 
100 x 3 x 250.000 = 125.000.000 € 
I N A C T I V I T Y   C O S T S 
Single menu price 5 €/menu 
Airplane capacity 132 passengers 
Number of flights 12 flights/month 
Lost airline companies 3 
5 x 132 x 12 x 3 = 23.760 €/month 
Implementation of a Food Defense plan to prevent food terrorism in an airline catering   41 
Escola Superior d’Agricultura de Barcelona 
UPC - BarcelonaTech 
Although the probability of the attack is so low, there is still a chance that an act like this may 
happen, and the big significance of the attack costs is one of the reasons why it is important to 
have a good insurance to cover this probability. 
When choosing an insurance for the company, the terrorism is covered by paying an additional 
premium. The sum insured may include material damages and business interruption. The 
premium charged varies depending on the risk and the sum insured. [13] 
There are several insurance companies with no cover of death by a terrorism act. In Spain, in 1954 
the Insurance Compensation Consortium was created with the aim of compensate the victims of 
acts derived from terrorism that have contracted some type of insurance of life or accident policy. 
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Conclusions 
It is very easy to damage the activity of an agri-food company and cause economic damage. There 
are several groups or types of people that may consider intentional contamination of food to 
further their cause, but internal staff are the most dangerous because they know well the facilities 
and have already access to them. 
To avoid the typical incidents that can occur like an intrusion, it is essential to assure some basic 
control measures like not leaving visitors alone in the facility and have restricted access to critical 
areas, controlling all the staff working in the building and keeping all access points locked. 
Even so, the lack of awareness to inform of strange circumstances (opened product bags, opened 
doors, strange staff…) and not giving true importance to deliberate acts that could happen, are 
possible shortcomings that can interfere with the process. That is why the best way of prevention 
and detection of sabotage signs is staff training. 
As shows the economic valuation, there is a significant increase of the plan benefit as the 
probability increases, reaching profits of up to 1 million euros. However, in this case it is a 
medium-sized catering that serves a few airlines, and at the low probability is added the lesser 
impact that an attack would have when considering few affected flights.  
Even so, as previously mentioned, the Food Defense plan implementation provides a better image 
versus the competition and a higher probability of being chosen by the airline companies due to 
the improvement of the security measures. This could mean a higher number of customers and 
therefore a better business. In conclusion, the implementation of the Food Defense Plan could 
indirectly lead to an economic benefit. 
A great way to prove the Food Defense system is doing its job is to conduct a food terrorism 
simulation in the facility to evaluate the weak points of the protection and prevention measures 
along with the consequences that it entails. 
It is recommended to create security from the beginning (prevention), to do inspections and tests 
based on risks (intervention) and have a quick reaction and effective communication (answer). 
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Annexes 
Annex A. Risk assessment key 
 
A   C   C   E   S   S   I   B   I   L   I   T   Y Punctuation 
Easily accessible 
The target is outside the building and there is no perimeter 
fence. 
9-10 
Accessible 
The target is inside the building, but in an uninsured part of 
the establishment. 
7-8 
Partially accessible 
The target is inside the building, in a relatively unprotected, 
but highly active part of the establishment. 
5-6 
Hard to access 
The target is inside the building, in a protected part of the 
establishment. 
3-4 
Not accessible 
There are physical barriers, alarms and surveillance to avoid 
reaching the goal. 
1-2 
 
 
C   R   I   T   I   C   A   L   I   T   Y Punctuation 
Very critical 
With a significant loss of human lives or more than 90% of the 
company's economic value. 
9-10 
Critical 
With loss of human lives or losses between 61% and 90% of the 
company's economic value. 
7-8 
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Slightly critical 
Without loss of human lives although there is severe intoxication 
or losses between 31% and 60% of the company's economic 
value. 
5-6 
Barely critical 
Without loss of human lives. Losses between 10% and 30% of the 
company's economic value. 
3-4 
Not critical 
Without loss of human lives. Losses less than 10% of the 
company's economic value. 
1-2 
 
V   U   L   N   E   R   A   B   I   L   I   T   Y Punctuation 
Very vulnerable 
The product is openly exposed and there is enough time to 
allow the introduction of the polluting agent without being 
seen. A uniform mixture disperses the agent. 
9-10 
Vulnerable 
The product has a certain degree of open exposure and there 
is almost enough time to introduce the polluting agent 
without being seen. The product will be mixed. 
7-8 
Slightly vulnerable 
The product has limited exposure points and limited periods 
when contaminants can be added without being seen. The 
agent may not be well mixed. 
5-6 
Barely vulnerable 
The product has limited exposure points but is almost always 
under observation while is in the production phase. There is 
little or no mixing for disperse the agent. 
3-4 
Not vulnerable 
The product is in sealed containers and ducts that do not have 
exposure points or is under full and controlled observation. 
The product is solid or very difficult to mix. 
1-2 
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Annex B. Localization and significance of the critical areas 
 
BASEMENT 
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